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This paper seeks to examine the various changes in Egypt's legal framework following
the Arab Spring in January 2011 and how, despite strengthened protections, military trials
for civilians have surged. The increase in military trials for civilians is worrisome as the
procedures currently adopted erode civilians' due process rights. The new Egyptian Con-
stitution, which took effect in 2014, provides a unique opportunity for the Egyptian Su-
preme Constitutional Court to limit the military courts' continually expanding
jurisdiction, as well as scrutinize the level of procedural protection afforded to civilians
that end up facing trial before those courts. Although the Constitution now provides for
military trials for civilians-in particular circumstances-it also elevates numerous due pro-
cess guarantees to the status of constitutional rights. This status empowers the Supreme
Constitutional Court to review the legal framework that governs jurisdiction and proce-
dure in cases where civilians are tried before military courts. Beyond limiting the military
courts' jurisdiction, bringing those courts' procedural standards in line with now constitu-
tionally protected due process rights would acutely reduce the allure of employing military
courts to try a broad swath of civilians for a highly expansive set of offenses. In this
endeavor, the military justice frameworks of two other countries-the United States and
Germany-may provide useful examples for aligning these proceedings with the constitu-
tional protections, while still allowing civilians to be tried in the military justice system
when required in carefully delineated circumstances.
The first section of this paper will provide an introduction to the Egyptian legal system.
It will include a broad political history of the country from 1952 to the present, an outline
of the legal changes after the Arab Spring in 2011, and an overview of the due process
violations that occur during military trials for civilians. The second section will focus on
the military courts' composition, jurisdiction, and appeals procedure, with a focus on the
legal bases for the aforementioned. The third section will cover the Supreme Constitu-
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tional Court's competency for review, its prior case law on due process issues, lower
courts' jurisprudence on the same issues, and an analysis of instances where military trials
for civilians are in violation of the 2014 Constitution's provisions. Finally, the fourth
section will analyze the U.S. military justice system and how it may serve as a model for
the Supreme Constitutional Court to re-structure the Egyptian system. The U.S. legal
framework can serve as a particularly useful example, as it allows for military trials for
civilians, and the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) has reviewed the issue
on numerous occasions. SCOTUS has circumscribed military courts' jurisdiction and
procedure to conform to both the U.S. Constitution and due process guarantees, and has
done so not only with respect to civilians who fall within the military courts' jurisdiction,
but also to protect combatants-both lawful and unlawful-under U.S. control.
"As goes Egypt, so goes the rest of the Arab world."' This popular refrain reflects the
reality that Egypt, the Arab world's most populous country, 2 responsible for the produc-
tion of some of the region's most widely disseminated news, literature, and film, holds an
enormous amount of influence in other Arabic-speaking countries in the Middle East.
The route Egypt takes will strongly influence the future of the rule of law in many Arab
countries, from moderate reforms taking place in Jordan to the eventual shape of Libyan
rule of law following Muammar al-Ghaddafi's downfall.
I. Historical Introduction
Egypt has been particularly influential to other Arab countries in the legal field.3 The
most famous Arab jurist of the twentieth century was Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhury, a profes-
sor at the Cairo University law school. He redrafted Egypt's Civil Code in 19494 and it
served as a template for many countries in the Arab world, which recreated major features
of the Egyptian system.5 Gulf States, for example, obtained Egyptian assistance in draft-
ing their own constitutions and codes, and often employed Egyptians to staff their courts,6
in addition to nationals who graduated from Egyptian universities or were otherwise
trained in Egypt.
The increase in the use of military courts to try civilians-which constitutes an erosion of
due process and greatly impacts people's civil and political rights-is a source of great
concern as countries in the region attempt to change their systems of government away
from powerful executive branches.
1. Think Tank: The Vital Middle in the Middle East, PUB. BROAD. SERv. (Jul. 30, 1998) (Transcript), http://
www.pbs.org/thinktank/show_63 1.html; The World: Why Egypt Crisis Worries Neighbors, PUB. RADIO INT'L
(Jul. 8, 2013), available at http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-07-08/why-egypt-crisis-worries-neighbors;
Lucette Lagnado, Saying Goodbye to Egypt Again, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB 10001424053111903927204576570921448275448; Russell Raymond, As Goes Egypt, So Goes Tuni-
sia? Not Quite, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/freedom-house/as-goes-
egypt-so-goes-tun b_3732252.html.
2. Egypt, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, (last updated Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html (follow "Introduction").
3. Its efforts in codifying law began in 1875. CHIBLI MALLAT, INTRODUCTION TO MDDLE EASTERN
LAw 262 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2007).
4. Id. at 331, 350.
5. See NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE
GULF 17 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997).
6. Id. at 4, 17.
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A. EGYPTIAN HISTORY FROM NASSER To 2011
Although Egyptians gained their independence from the United Kingdom on February
22, 1922, the modern Egyptian nation state's birth can be traced to the Free Officer's
Movement Revolution in 1952 and the end of monarchic rule in the country.7 After
Muhammad Naguib's short-lived presidency, Gamal Abdel Nasser took power and ruled
as president from 1956 to 1970. Egypt's first Constitution, ratified in 1923, provided for
the ability to declare martial law; it was first declared in 1939 and lasted through the end
of the Second World War.8 Martial law was again imposed from 1948 to 1950 as a result
of the Arab-Israeli War and from 1952, following Suez Canal protests, until Gamal Abdel
Nasser assumed the presidency in 1956.9 Nasser himself re-imposed martial law on two
occasions: in November 1956 as a result of the Suez War and in 1958 during the union
with Syria.' 0
In 1958, Nasser enacted the Law Concerning the State of Emergency, Law 165 of 1958
(Emergency Law), which granted the President extraordinary powers, including the ability
to refer certain cases to military courts. From that date until May 31, 2012, the Emer-
gency Law was continuously in effect, with the exception of a brief eighteen-month period
preceding President Sadat's death in 1981.11 Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor, followed
the centralized executive model of governance, which was continued under Hosni
Mubarak's rule upon Sadat's death.1 2 Mubarak enacted several constitutional amend-
ments in 2007 responding to pressure to repeal the Emergency Law.1 3 But the amend-
ments served to constitutionalize many of those emergency powers.' 4
B. ARAB SPRING: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES
In February 2011, President Hosni Mubarak was toppled following massive popular
protests that brought the nation to a standstill for eighteen days.' 5 Following these pro-
tests, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces took power with General Mohammad
Tantawi acting as interim president.1 6 The military council issued various Constitutional
Declarations in 2011, among them, one limiting the duration of a declared state of emer-
gency to only six months pending approval by popular referendum.17 Mohammad Morsi,
the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, won the presidential election and took office on June
7. Sadiq Reza, Endless Emergency: The Case of Egypt, 10 NEW CRum. L. Rv. 532, 540 (2007).
8. Id. at 535-36.
9. Id. at 536.
10. Id.
11. Ahmed Eldakak, Approaching Rule of Law in Post-Revolution Egypt, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL.
261, 285 (2012); Int'l Comm'n of jurists [ICJ], Egypt: A Flawed Constitutional Reform Process, 42 (Nov. 13,
2012), http://www.refworld.org/docid/530ef8a34.html.
12. All three presidents were part of the military.
13. Reza, supra note 7, at 541.
14. Article 179 of the 1971 Constitution was amended to allow exceptions to the Criminal Procedure Code
with respect to anti-terrorism efforts, specifically the warrant requirement for searches and seizures, arrest
and detention, home entry, and surveillance and seizure of correspondence. It also enshrined the President's
power to refer terrorism cases to military and other special courts. Id. at 537, 541-42.
15. Egypt Profile-Timeline, BBC (May 29, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- 13315719.
16. Eldakak, supra note 11, at 276.
17. Id. at 303 (citing The Temporary Constitutional Declaration of 2011, Al-]arida Al-Rasmyya, 30 Mar.
2011, No. 12bis(B), art 59 (Egypt)).
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30, 2012.1s A new Constitution was approved by the Constituent Assembly and took ef-
fect after a popular referendum on December 22, 2012.19 But on July 3, 2013, Morsi was
ousted and replaced by the president of the Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, who
served as interim president and subsequently by General Abdul al-Sisi, who assumed the
presidency on June 8, 2014, following the May 2014 elections.20 Anew draft Constitution
was approved and took effect on January 18, 2014, following a popular referendum, and is
the current Egyptian Constitution. 2 1
The end of Mubarak's thirty-year regime led to a succession of legal changes nominally
intended to bring about sweeping changes guaranteeing freedom and democracy. One
widely reviled piece of legislation,22 the Emergency Law, 23 expired on May 31, 2012, and
was not renewed. 24 The Emergency Law, further discussed infra, granted sweeping pow-
ers of detention and referral to military or state security courts for categories of crimes to
be defined by the President. Over the years, these categories expanded to include any
violation that might relate to military matters, persons or objects, "terrorism", and "thug-
gery", the last two being very broadly defined crimes. "Terrorism" covers "any threat or
intimidation with the aim of disturbing the peace or jeopardizing the safety and security of
the society," and the hindrance of "public authorities in the performance of their work." 25
"Thuggery" is formally defined as displaying force or threatening to use force with the
intent to intimidate or cause harm; however, it has been broadly interpreted as encom-
passing breaking curfews, destroying public property, theft, and a variety of other acts. 26
This allowed civilians to be detained and tried before military and state security courts for
virtually any crime.
18. Matt Bradley, Morsi Takes Office, Praises Egyptian Military, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2012), http://on-
line.wsj.com/news/arcles/SB10001424052702304058404577498384052282866.
19. Shaimaa Khalil, Egyptian Constitution "Approved" in Referendum, BBC (Dec. 23, 2012), http://www.bbc
.com/news/world-nmiddle-east-2082991 1.
20. Patrick Kingsley & Martin Chulov, MohamedMorsi Ousted in Egypt's Second Revolution in Two Years, THE
GUARDIAN (July 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/Jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-
revolution; David D. Kirkpatrick, Army Ousts Egypt's President; Morsi is Taken Into Military Custody, N.Y.
TIMEs (July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html?pagewanted=all;
Ben Wedeman, Reza Sayah & Matt Smith, Coup Topples Egypt'sMorsy; Deposed President Under "House Arrest",
CNN (July 4, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests/.
21. David D. Kirkpatrick, Overwhelming Vote for Egypt' Constitution Ruises Concern, N.Y. TIMES (Tan. 18,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/world/middleeast/vote-validates-egypts-constitution-and-mili-
tary-takeover.html; Egypt Constitution Approved by 98.1 Percent, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (Jan. 24, 2014), http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/egypt-constitution-approved-981-percent-2014118163264705
32.html.
22. One of the demonstrators' principal demands during the Revolution of 2011 was to repeal the Emer-
gency Law. Eldakak, supra note 11, at 302; The Demands of the Egyptian Revolution, CODEPINK (2011), http://
www.codepinkarchive.org/article.php?id=5695.
23. Eldakak, supra note 11, at 285; Int'l Comm'n of Jurists (ICJ), supra note 11.
24. Egypt Lifs Popular Emergency Law, CNN (Jan. 24, 2014), www.edition.cnn.com/2012/05/3 1/world/af-
rica/egypt-emergency-law/index.html.
25. Eldakak, supra note 11, at 287, n.158; Law No. 58 of 1937 (Penal Code), Al-]arida Al-Rasmyya, 5 Aug.
1937, art. 46 (Egypt).
26. Eric Trager, Egypt's Militay Thunals: Illiberal and Destahilizing, THE WASH. INST. (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypts-military-tribunals-illiberal-and-destabiliz
ing; article 375(bis) of the Penal Code.
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Although the Emergency Law has not been renewed, the 2014 Constitution explicitly
permits military trials for civilians under article 204.27 Its wording appears to narrow
military tribunals' jurisdiction over civilians,28 but these types of trials have surged since
2011.29
C. DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN MILITARY TRIALS
Military courts are governed by the Code of Military Justice, Law 25 of 1966, discussed
infra, while state security courts are governed by the now-dormant Emergency Law. Mili-
tary courts have jurisdiction over crimes by members of the armed forces, as well as over
civilians as described in article 204 of the 2014 Constitution and the Code of Military
Justice. 30 Section 6 of the Code, which was repealed in 2012, also permitted the President
to refer cases to the military courts.3 1 State security courts had jurisdiction over violations
of Presidential orders issued pursuant to his powers under the Emergency Law, and over
criminal offenses the President referred to those courts during a state of emergency. 32
Military courts-much like state security courts-operate secretively, which makes it diffi-
cult to ascertain how criminal procedure law is implemented de ficto.3 3 Both news and
human rights reports reveal that defendants do not receive basic due process rights. Un-
like civilian trials, which follow constitutionally established criminal procedure that guar-
antees access to counsel, the right to appeal, and other fair trial guarantees, military
tribunals currently operate in a legal vacuum. Detainees are often held in very poor con-
ditions and mistreated.34 "The trials can take place in as little as five minutes. Defendants
27. INT'L COAL. FOR FREEDOMS & RIGHTs, Civilians' Referral to Militay Trihunals in Egypt, 12, http://
www.icfr.info/en/wp-content/uploads/Civilians-referral-to-military-tribunals-in-Egypt.pdf (last visited Feb.
12, 2016) (stating that "for crimes that constitute a direct assault against military facilities or camps of the
Armed Forces, or their equivalents, against military zones or border zones determined as military zones,
against the Armed Forces' equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents, military secrets, or its
public funds, or against military factories; crimes pertaining to military service; or crimes that constitute a
direct assault against the officers or personnel of the Armed Forces by reason of performing their duties.");
CODEPINK, supra note 22.
28. It appears to narrow jurisdiction through its wording, which implies that civilians will only be prose-
cuted before military courts if they commit a "direct assault" against the functioning of the military. As will
be discussed, infra, this is not the case.
29. As many civilians were prosecuted before military courts in the three months following Mubarak's
ouster alone (11,879 persons) as during Mubarak's entire 30-year rule (nearly 12,000 persons). Egypt: Retry or
Free 12,000 After Unfair Military Trials, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/09/10/Egypt-retry-or-free-12000-after-unfair-military-trials; Erin Banco, Egypt's Sisi Extends
Reach of Military Courts Reminiscent of Mubarak Era, INT'L Bus. TIMEs (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.ibtimes
.com/egypts-sisi-extends-reach-military-courts-reminiscent-mubarak-era-1724829.




33. Elizabeth Arrott, Egyptian Civilians Caught in Military Trihbunals, VOICE OF AMERICA (Aug. 16, 2011),
http://www.voanews.com/content/egyptian-civilians-caught-in-military-tribunals-127950738/143936.html.
34. Jack Shenker, Egyptian ]unta Pledges to Free Hundreds After Damning Prison Letter is Published, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/02/egypt-military-promises-par-
don-civilians; Alaa Abd El Fattah, After Egypt's Revolution, I Never Expected to be Back in Mubarak' ]ails, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/02/egypt-revolution-
back-mubarak-jails; Kristen Chick, Rare Success Story for Egypt's Revolution: Ending Military Trials, CHRISTIAN
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sometimes cannot choose their lawyers, and are sometimes allowed to say only a single
word before the military judge." 35 Defendants are sometimes prevented from accessing an
attorney of their choosing, and when they are given access, the attorneys are often not
granted enough time to review the evidence and other documents properly.36 Although
amendments in 2007 introduced an appeals system that permits defendants to appeal to a
higher military court, the defendant may not file the appeal until a certification officer
ratifies the court of first instance's judgment.37 As the certification officer is not com-
pelled to ratify within a specific period of time, this often results in prolonged detention
and a total deprivation of the defendant's ability to appeal.38
By mid-2012, over twelve thousand civilians had faced trial before military tribunals,
with Human Rights Watch reporting that at least forty-three juveniles were submitted to
military trials.39 Although the new Egyptian Constitution explicitly permits military trials
for civilians, its provisions are unusual in that they expand the array of due process guaran-
tees enshrined in the Constitution, including access to counsel and the right to appeal,
which stand in direct opposition to civilians' current treatment before military tribunals.
The new Constitution theoretically ensures that all defendants are granted basic fair trial
guarantees, regardless of whether they fall under the jurisdiction of military courts under
the new Constitution.
II. Military Court Jurisdiction and Its Legal Bases
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MILITARY TRIALS FOR CIVILIANS
Military Courts' mandate is provided for in article 204 of the 2014 Egyptian Constitu-
tion. Article 204 states as follows:
The Military Court is an independent judicial body exclusively competent to adjudi-
cate on all crimes pertaining to the Armed Forces, the officers and personnel thereof,
and their equivalents, and on the crimes committed by the personnel of the General
Intelligence while and by reason of performing their duties.
No civilian shall face trial before the Military Court, except for crimes that constitute
a direct assault against military facilities or camps of the Armed Forces, or their
equivalents, against military zones or border zones determined as military zones,
against the Armed Forces' equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents,
SCIENCE MONITOR (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0426/Rare-suc-
cess-story-for-Egypt-s-revoludon-ending-military-trials.
35. Kristen Chick, spra note 34.
36. Military Trials of Civilians in Egypt since the ]anuary 25 Revolution, CAIRO INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
STUDIES & No MILITARY TRIALS FOR CIVILIANS GRP. 3 (June 2012), www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/06/Military-Trials-of-Civilians-in-Egypt-since-the-January-25-Revolution.pdf. For example, Ahmed
Helmy, an attorney currently representing four civilians facing military trial has stated that he was not al-
lowed to visit his clients in custody and first met them at their initial court hearing. Egypt: Unprecedented
Expansion of the Militay, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/17/
egypt-unprecedented-expansion-military-courts.
37. CAIRO INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 36.
38. Id.
39. Egypt: Children on Trial, HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/
27/egypt-children-trial.
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military secrets, or its public funds, or against military factories; crimes pertaining to
military service; or crimes that constitute a direct assault against the officers or per-
sonnel of the Armed Forces by reason of performing their duties.
The law shall define such crimes, and specify the other competences of the Military
Court.
Members of the Military Court shall be independent and shall be immune to dismis-
sal. They shall have all the guarantees, rights and duties stipulated for the members
of other judicial bodies. 40
This article appears to give the military tribunals a much narrower jurisdiction over
civilians than any previous constitutional iteration on the subject. The 2013 draft Consti-
tution produced by the Committee of Ten, for example, defined the military courts' juris-
diction over civilians more vaguely and thus more broadly. Article 174 of that draft stated:
"[c]ivilians shall not be tried before military courts except for crimes that are direct
wrongdoings to the Armed Forces, and the law shall define such crimes and other jurisdic-
tions of the Military Judiciary."4 1 Ultimately, the final version of the Constitution appears
to much more narrowly define those crimes that are direct wrongdoings to the Armed
Forces. But the 2014 Constitution still uses many vague terms, which allow for continu-
ally expanding military court jurisdiction. The term "direct assault" and "their
equivalents" are never defined and have been often construed to mean that a case must be
heard before a military, rather than civilian, tribunal.
Furthermore, article 204 of the 2014 Constitution defines military courts' jurisdiction
to include crimes that constitute a direct attack against military holdings, properties,
funds, and personnel. This is particularly troublesome given the Egyptian military's ex-
tensive property ownership and involvement in the Egyptian economy. The Arab Organi-
zation for Industrialization and the National Service Projects Organization are directly
overseen by the Egyptian military (the Ministry of State for Military Production and the
Ministry of Defense, respectively).42 The military's economic activities include produc-
tion of household appliances, agrarian projects, hotels, maritime transportation, waste-
water treatment plants, gas stations, construction projects, and even the production of
basic foodstuffs like pasta.4 3 In sum, military projects constitute around five to fifteen
percent (5-15%) of the country's gross domestic product.4 4 Therefore, even under the
40. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014 at art. 204, translated in Comparing
Three Versions ofthe Egyptian Constitution, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http://comparativecon-
situtionsproject.org/comparing-the-egyptian-constitution (an unofficial English translation).; see also INT'L
COALITION FOR FREEDOMS & RIGHTS, supra note 27.
41. Nancy Messieh, An Eye on Egypt'sAmended Constitution: Military Articles, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Oct. 2,
2013), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/an-eye-on-egypt-s-amended-consruon-military-
articles.
42. Cherine Chams El-Dine, The Military and Egypt's Transformation Process, 6 SWP COMMENTs 1, 2 (Feb.
2013), http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2013CO6_ced.pdf.
43. Id. at 2-3; SherifTarek, Inside Egypt's Draft Constitution: Dehates Over Military Powers Continue, AHRAM
ONLINE (Dec. 12, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/88582.aspx; Zeinab Abul-Magd, Egypt's Military
Business: The Need for Change, MIDDLE EAST INST. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.mei.edu/content/map/
egypt's-nilitary-business-need-change.
44. El-Dine, supra note 42, at 3; see also Joshua Stacher, Deeper Militarism in Egypt, MIDDLE EAST INST'
(Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.mei.edu/content/deeper-militarism-egypt.
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seemingly restrictive provisions of article 204, an Egyptian civilian could be tried before a
military tribunal for an altercation at a military-owned gas station or wedding hall.45 It
has also been argued that the phrase "or their equivalents" could be interpreted to include
civilian employees at military-owned businesses. 46 A recent presidential decree, promul-
gated in October 2014 and discussed infra, declared public areas and vital installations as
"equivalent" to military areas and vastly expanded military courts' jurisdiction.
The 2012 Constitution contained a similar, more vaguely worded provision allowing
trials of civilians before military courts. Article 198 of that Constitution stated "[c]ivilians
cannot stand trial before military courts except for crimes that harm the armed forces.
The law defines such crimes and determines the other competencies of the Military Judi-
ciary." 47 The 2012 Constitution's provision was problematic in that it referred to vague
harms against the Armed Forces. Although the 2014 Constitution seems to limit this
jurisdiction to offences involving military members and military property, it also allows
for military courts' competency to be further defined by law.
Specifically, the 2014 Constitution contains a provision in common with the two previ-
ous Constitutions of 2012 and 1971. The three versions all state that "[tlhe law defines
such crimes and determines the other competencies of the Military Judiciary."48 This
wording was the only provision in the 1971 Constitution, contained in article 183 that
referred to the existence of the military judiciary. Nevertheless, thousands of civilians
throughout the Mubarak regime 49 and nearly 11,879 civilians in the year following
Mubarak's ouster were tried before military tribunals pursuant to this provision.50 The
law referred to in all three Constitutions is the Code of Military Justice, which governs the
military judiciary and provides for a wider competency to try civilians than specified in
article 204 of the 2014 Constitution.
B. MILITARY COURTS' COMPOSITION
Per article 204 of the 2014 Constitution, military tribunals' structure and competencies
are defined by law, specifically the Code of Military Justice. 5' Section 43 of the Code of
Military Justice structures military courts into a Supreme Military Court, a Central Mili-
tary Court with Supreme Authority and a Central Military Court. Section 44 specifies
that the Supreme Military Court is composed of three judge officers, presided over by the
senior judge, whose rank cannot be inferior to that of lieutenant colonel. Section 47 also
stipulates that in some cases there may be five judges sitting in a case. There will also be
45. Sherif Tarek, supra note 43.
46. Sonia Farid, Military Trial Back to Haunt Egyptian Civilians, AL ARABIYA NEws (Dec. 2, 2013), http://
english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2013/12/02/Military-trials-back-to-haunt-Egyptian-civilians
.html.
47. CONSTITUTION OF THE AAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012 at art. 198, translated in Comparing
Three Versions of the Egyptian Constitution, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http://comparativecon-
situtionsproject.org/comparing-the-egyptian-constitution (an unofficial English translation).
48. David Risley, Egypt's ]udiciay: Obstructing or Assisting Reform?, MIDDLE EAST INST. (Jan. 13, 2016),
http://www.mei.edu/content/at/egypt's-judiciary-obstructing-or-assisting-reform.
49. One report which states that around 1,033 civilians were tried before military courts in the period
between 1992 and 2000, with 644 defendants receiving imprisonment sentences and 92 defendants subjected
to the death penalty. Reza, supra note 7, at 641.
50. Stacher, supra note 44.
51. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT at art. 204.
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one military prosecutor and a clerk. Under section 50, the Supreme Military Court may
consider all crimes committed by officers or crimes in which officers take part, and felo-
nies included in the competence of military jurisdiction. Section 51 further restricts these
two felonies carrying the punishment of the death penalty or hard labor. The court is
entitled to decide which felonies fall within its competence - whether prescribed by mili-
tary law or under the Penal Code and regardless of the perpetrator's status as military or
civilian.5 2
The Central Military Court with Supreme Authority is composed of an individual judge
whose rank is at least that of a major, per section 45. There will also be a military prose-
cutor and a clerk. Section 47 dictates that in some cases, the court may be composed of
three judges. Section 51 sets its jurisdiction as comprehending all felonies within the mili-
tary tribunals' jurisdiction that can be punished through imprisonment or hard labor, re-
gardless of the perpetrator's military or civilian status, except if they are officers, as the
Supreme Military Court has exclusive jurisdiction over them.
The Central Military Court is, according to section 46, composed of one judge whose
rank is of captain or higher. Under section 47, the court may be comprised of three
judges at the request of the presiding judge. A military prosecutor and a clerk must also
be present. Per section 52, this court has jurisdiction over misdemeanors and petty of-
fenses, whether stipulated under military or ordinary law and regardless of whether the
perpetrator is military or civilian, except if the perpetrator is an officer.
Following an amendment to section two in 2007, military judges must now fulfill the
same qualification requirements as civilian judges as defined in article 38 of the 1972 Law
on Judicial Authority. In other words, they must possess, at minimum, a law degree. 3
But section 57 of the Code specifies that military judges are subject to all aspects of mili-
tary law, including discipline and obedience, in contravention to the judicial independence
requirement mandated by law.54 Additionally, the executive branch appoints military
judges to renewable two-year terms, which further compromises their independence.55
C. JURISDICTION UNDER THE CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, LAw 25 oF 1966
The Code of Military Justice, law 25/1966 governs military courts, much like the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice governs Courts Martial in the United States. Unlike the
latter, however, Egyptian military courts are granted jurisdiction over civilians. The ear-
lier provisions of this law articulate the breadth of the military justice system's jurisdiction.
Section five states that military courts have jurisdiction over:
(1) Crimes committed against the safety, security or interests of the armed forces,
(2) Crimes stipulated in the Military and National Service Code, and
52. Seif el-Islam, Exceptional Law and Exceptional Courts, in EGYPT AND ITs LAws 359, 373 (Nathalie Ber-
nard-Maugiron & Baudouin Dupret eds., 2002); see also Mohamed Nour Farhat & Ali Sadek, Promoting the
Rule of Law and Integrity in the Arab Countries Project, ACRLI, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
research/Egypt/EgyptFinalReportP2S4_En.pdf.
53. Hafez Abu Seada, Exceptional Courts and the Natural ]udge, in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN
EGYPT 171, 171 (Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, ed., 2008).
54. Id.
55. Freedom in the World 2013: Egypt, FREEDOM HOUSE (2013), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2013/egypt#.VQK12kYnutw.
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(3) Crimes committed in army bases, barracks, establishments, factories, ships, planes,
vehicles, spaces, things or places, wherever they may be, operated by army person-
nel on behalf of the armed forces.56
The military courts possess jurisdiction regardless of whether the crime is committed by
uniformed military personnel or civilians. This section is now enshrined in the Constitu-
tion itself by reference to the Code of Military Justice in article 204. Section 7 of the
Code grants additional jurisdiction over civilians where a member of the armed forces is
one of the parties involved in the offence being tried. 57 Under section 8 bis, minors may
also be tried before military courts if they were accompanied by an adult subject to mili-
tary jurisdiction at the time of the offence.58 Perhaps most troublingly, section 48 of the
Code grants the military judiciary itself the exclusive competence to determine whether a
specific crime falls under its jurisdiction. 59
The Code of Military Justice was amended in 2012. Section 6, which granted extensive
powers to the President, was repealed. Section 6 stated:
The provisions of this law apply to crimes provided for in the first and second chap-
ters of the second book of the Penal Code, as well as crimes that are related to it,
which will be referred to the military court following a decision by the President of
the Republic.
When a state of emergency is declared, the President of the Republic may refer any
cases punishable under the Penal Code or any other law.6 0
Those chapters of the Penal Code deal with "Felonies and Misdemeanors harmful to
the Government's Security from a Source Abroad" and "Felonies and Misdemeanors In-
ternally Prejudicial to the Government," articles 77-102F. 61 These articles encompass a
wide array of crimes, many of them vaguely defined and harshly penalized. For example,
article 77 of the Penal Code states that "[a]ny person who commits premeditatedly a deed
that leads to affecting the country's independence, unity and the integrity of its territories
shall be punished with a sentence of death." 62
56. Law No. 25 of 1966 (Code of Military Justice, reformed in 2012), Al-]arida Al-Ranjyya 6 june 1966
§ 5, (Egypt) (unofficial English translation on file with author, courtesy of Farah Al Haddad, NYU School of
Law, candidate for J.D. 2017).
57. Egypt: New Law Keeps Military Trials of Civilians, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May, 7, 2012), http://www
.hrw.org/news/2012/05/07/egypt-new-law-keeps-military-trials-civilians; Menna Hegab, Constitution-Backed
"Military State": Fact or Fiction?, EGYPT INDEPENDENT (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.egyptindependent.com/
news/constitution-backed-military-state-fact-or-fiction.
58. Law No. 25 of 1966, at § 8(bis)(1); Egypt: Children on Trial, supra note 39; Egypt: New Laws Keep Military
Trials of Civilians, CHILD RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL NETWORK, (May 9, 2012), http://www.crin.org/en/li-
brary/news-archive/egypt-new-laws-keep-military-trials-civilians.
59. ]ustice at a Crossroads: The Legal Profession and the Rule ofLaw in the New Egypt, IBAHRI 20 (Nov. 2011),
available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=981DD862-B07F-4E6F-SAl7-
EDC9E9DO7D64.
60. Article 6(2) Law No 25 of 1966 (as amended by Law No. 5 of 1970).
61. Law No. 58 of 1937 (Promulgating the Penal Code), Al-]arida Al-Rasmiyya (Egypt), art. 46.
62. Id. art. 77.
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Several of these articles are particularly vulnerable to exploitation against journalist de-
fendants.63 Article 80C, for example, states that imprisonment must be imposed for
"whoever deliberately discloses in time of war, false or tendentious news, information or
rumors, or willfully propagates provocative publicity, which is all liable to attain harm and
damage to the military preparations for the country's defense, . . . military operations,
create panic among the people, or weaken the nation's toleration and endurance." Many
of the articles in those chapters also deal with crimes of "terrorism." Article 86 of the
Penal Code broadly defines terrorism as:
all use of force, violence, threatening or frightening, to which a felon resorts in exe-
cution of an individual or collective criminal scheme, with the aim of disturbing pub-
lic order, or exposing the safety and security of society to danger, if this is liable to
harm the persons, or throw horror among them, expose their life, freedom or security
to danger, damage the environment, causes detriment to communications, transport,
property and funds, buildings, public or private properties, occupying or taking pos-
session of them, preventing or obstructing the work of public authorities, worship
houses, or educational institutions, or interrupting the application of the constitution,
laws, or statutes. 64
Depending on the classification of the terrorist acts committed, punishment under the
Penal Code can range from imprisonment or temporary hard labor to capital
punishment.6 s
In 1993, the Minister of Justice attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the Pres-
ident's power to refer cases to military tribunals under section six before the Supreme
Constitutional Court. The Court, however, decided that section six of the code was con-
stitutional. 66 Although section six of the Code of Military Justice-which granted the Pres-
ident the power to refer cases to military tribunals-was repealed in part on May 6, 2012,67
the Emergency Law has been lifted, and article 179 of the 1971 Constitution, which gave
the President the power to refer terrorism cases to military or state security courts, was
effectively overturned by the 2012 and 2014 Constitutions which grant no such power; 68
military courts continue to have jurisdiction over civilians. Military judges' power to rule
on their jurisdictional competency under section 48 of the Code of Military Justice, 69
63. Agence France-Presse, Egypt to Allow Appeals Against Military Court Verdicts, INTERAKSYON (Feb. 3,
2014), http://www.interaksyon.com/article/79960/egypt-to-allow-appeals-against-military-court-verdicts
(discussing in late 2013 and early 2014, three Egyptian journalists have been tried and sentenced in military
court for "reporting without authorization in a military zone," "impersonating a military officer over the
phone" and "photographing army checkpoints").
64. Law No. 58 of 1937 (Promulgating the Penal Code), Al-]arida Al-Rasmiyya, art. 88.
65. Id. arts. 86(bis)-88 (Egypt).
66. Id. arts. 374-75; Supreme Constitutional Court, 1/15 (interpretation), 30 Jan. 1993, Official Gazette,
Vol. 4 (bis).
67. Amendment Stripping President ofRight to Refer Civilians to Militay Trials Approved, EGYPT INDEP. (Apr.
10, 2012), http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/amendment-stripping-president-right-refer-civilians-
military-trials-approved; Egypt: New Law Keeps Militay Trials of Civilians, supra note 56; Egypt: President Morsy
Should End Militay Trals of Civilians, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jul. 15, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/
2012/07/15/egypt-president-morsy-should-end-military-trials-civilians.
68. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 179, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980,
May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007 (Eqypt).
69. El-Islam, supra note 52, at 374.
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coupled with Law 136 of 2014, discussed infra, effectively allows for military courts to try
civilians for these wide array of offenses: generally, if the offense involves a member of the
armed forces, takes place on military-owned property, or takes place within public prop-
erty or vital installations.70 Military courts hand down harsher sentences than civilian
courts, and given its convoluted appeals procedure, are effectively unable to be appealed.?1
Finally, a significant change is contained in article 237 concerning terrorism. Unlike
article 179 of the 1971 Constitution, the 2012 Constitution makes no reference to terror-
ism and the 2014 Constitution does not grant the President the power to refer terrorism
cases to "any judiciary body stipulated in the Constitution or the law." This is particularly
important because "terrorism" is a broad and malleable term that can be abused. Terror-
ism is listed as a crime in the Penal Code and can thus be tried in civilian courts. But
given the broad military judiciary jurisdiction, terrorist acts could still fall within the stipu-
lations in article 204 of the new Constitution or in the provisions of the Code of Military
Justice.
D. LAW FOR THE SECURING AND PROTECTION OF PUBLIC AND VITAL FACILITIES,
LAW 136 OF 2014
Following the death of at least thirty-one Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai Peninsula, Pres-
ident Sisi issued Law 136 of 2014. The presidential decree, titled Law for the Securing
and Protection of Public and Vital Facilities, renders "all public and vital facilities" as
"equivalent to military facilities" and are thus under military jurisdiction for the next two
years. 72 "Vital institutions" include power plants, oil fields, railroads, roads, and bridges;
while "public facilities" include universities and roads.73 Therefore, military tribunals can
try crimes such as destroying public property and blocking roads. 74 General Medhat
Ghozy, the head of the Military Judiciary Authority was interviewed on the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation on November 1, 2014, where he stated that the decree ex-
panded military courts' jurisdiction to cover "any building or property that provides a
general service or is state-owned." 75 Article 2 of the decree requires state prosecutors to
refer any crimes committed in those areas to military courts. 76 Some prosecutors and
judges have applied this article retroactively-to crimes committed before October 27,
2014, when the law was issued. 77
70. Civilians Referral to Militay Trihunals in Egypt, INT'L COALITION FOR FREEDOMS & RIGHTs, (Apr.
2015) http://www.icfr.info/en/wp-content/uploads/Civilians-referral-to-military-tribunals-in-Egypt.pdf
71. Tarek,supra note 43.
72. Egypt: Surge of Militay Trials, HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/
2014/12/18/Egypt-surge-military-trials; Patrick Kingsley, Egypt Places Civilian Infrastructure Under Army ]u-
risdiction, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/28/egypt-civilian-
infrastructure-army-jurisdiction-miltary-court.
73. Kingsley, spra note 72.
74. Erin Cunningham, Egypt's Leader Grants Militay Broad Powers to Put Civilians on Trial, WASH. POST
(Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egypts-leader-grants-military-broad-powers-to-put-
civilians-on-trial/2014/10/27/la041db2-aa97-4f69-a619-0ec50994fl67_story.html; Kingsley, spra note 70.
75. Egypt: Unprecedented Expansion ofMilitary Courts, supra note 37.
76. Id.
77. Egypt: Surge of Military Trials, supra note 72.
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Reports state that in the six weeks following the presidential decree, at least 820 civil-
ians were referred to military tribunals.8 In November 2014, five University students
accused of burning down Al-Azhar University's control room were referred to a military
court by a civilian criminal court judge.79 The civilian criminal judge originally presiding
over the case stated that he understood the presidential decree removed his court's juris-
diction to try the matter.80 On 4 December 2014, one prosecutor referred twenty-six men
to military court for rioting and belonging to the banned organization, the Muslim Broth-
erhood.81 On December 13, 2014, 438 supporters of former President Morsi were also
referred to military tribunals for participation in deadly violence following Morsi's
ouster, 82 even though 139 of them were already facing charges in civilian criminal courts
before being transferred.83 On December 15, 2014, top leaders of the Muslim Brother-
hood were among 310 other defendants transferred to military courts for trial over rioting
and inciting violence in Ismailia.84 Finally, prosecutors also referred forty others to mili-
tary courts for participating in protests, inciting violence and blocking roads-among them
were several underage girls.85
E. APPEALS OF MILITARY COURT VERDICTS
The Code of Military Justice also presents an obstacle to defendants who attempt to
appeal their verdicts. Although appeals to the Supreme Court of Military Appeals were
allowed under limited circumstances after an amendment to the law in April 2007,86 other
sections of the Code make those appeals practically impossible. As previously stated, sec-
tion 99 states that a certification officer-a person who does not witness the trial-has the
"absolute authority to amend or cancel the punishment, and cancel judgments of acquittal
and retrial, or suspend or annul a judgment".87 Without such certification, the defendant
cannot make a motion for an appeal, often leading to lengthy incarceration.8 8 Finally, the
President may also amend, abolish or postpone a sentence pursuant to sections 105, 112
and 116, but only after the certification officer has ratified the verdict.
78. Id.
79. Egypt: Unprecedented Expansion of Military Courts, supra note 37; see also Five Azhar Students Referred to
Military Trihbunal for Arson, AswAT MASR1YA (Nov. 16, 2014 4:59 PM), http://en.aswatnasriya.com/news/
view.aspx?id=b2b0b939-ac3b-44b6-98ea-75efbcf63442.
80. Id.
81. Egypt: Surge ofMilitay Trials, supra note 72.
82. Egypt Refers Hundreds to Militay Trihunals, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.dw.de/
egypt-refers-hundreds-to-military-tribunals/a-18127744.
83. Egypt: Surge of Military Trials, supra note 72.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Reza, supra note 7, at 541 (citing Law No. 16 of 2007 (Code of Military justice, amended in 2012), Al-
]ada Al-Rasmyya (Egypt)); Militay Trials of Civilians, supra note 36, at 2-3; Broken Promises: Egypt's Military
Rulers Erode Human Rights, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 34 (Nov. 2011) (Defendants who manage to appeal
will have their cases brought before the Supreme Court for Military Appeals. This court will only review the
law, its interpretation and procedural issues. It does not review the merits or evidentiary sufficiency of the
case.).
87. CAIRO INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES AND No MILITARY TRIALS FOR CIVILIANS, supra note 36,
at 2, n. 4.
88. Id. at 3.
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Appeals function very differently in the civilian criminal justice system. The ordinary
criminal justice system differentiates between lesser offences and greater offences. The
former-misdemeanors and violations-are tried in single-judge summary courts and they
are appealable before three-judge panels from the court of first instance (called misde-
meanor courts of appeal when convened for this purpose). Verdicts are further appealable
at a second level to the Court of Cassation.8 9 Felonies, on the other hand, are tried by
three-judge courts and the verdicts are appealable solely to the Court of Cassation, where
a panel of five judges hears the appeal.90 The Court of Cassation only reviews errors of
law committed by the trial court-whether there was a failure to apply the law, misappli-
cations or misinterpretations of the law, or legal insufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction. 9 1 Nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure, Law 150 of 1950, which gov-
erns all procedural matters in the civilian criminal justice system, requires ratification by
an officer in order to file an appeal. 92 Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
grants standing to appeal to convicted persons, parties liable in damages, and the State
representative (typically the Public Prosecutor). The party that wishes to appeal must do
so within ten days of the date when the judgment is issued; however, the Public Prosecu-
tor is granted a period of thirty days to file an appeal.93 To file an appeal, the party is
simply required to enter a declaration at the office of the court 94 that issued the
judgment. 95
F. LAW CONCERNING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, LAw 165 OF 1958
In addition to the problematic Article 204, the 2014 Constitution provides for the dec-
laration of a state of emergency in Article 154.96 This provision is similar to Article 148 of
the 1971 Constitution. 97 The new constitution, however, does provide for several new
safeguards. A state of emergency must now be approved by a majority of members of the
89. Reza, Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law, supra note 30, at 5-7 (indicanng the misdemeanor courts
of appeal hear criminal appeals).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 5-5, 5-6.
92. See Law 150 of 1950 (Code of Criminal Procedure), Al-]arida AI-Rasmyya § 177 (Egypt), available at
https://archive.org/stream/codecriminalpro00egypgoog/codecriminalpro00egypgoog-djvu.txt.
93. Id. § 177.
94. Id. § 178
95. Id. § 210 (indicates that the procedure for filing appeals in criminal cases must be done in accordance
with §§ 177-78).
96. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014, art. 154.
97. Article 148 of the 1971 Constitution states:
The President of the Republic shall proclaim a state of emergency in the manner prescribed by
the law.
Such proclamation must be submitted to the People's Assembly within the following fifteen days
so that the Assembly may take a decision thereon. In case of the dissolution of the People's
Assembly, the matter shall be submitted to the new Assembly at its first meeting.
In all cases, the proclamation of the state of emergency shall be for a limited period, which may
not be extended unless by approval of the Assembly.
Under the 1971 Constitution, there was no supermajority vote requirement, and the state of emergency could
remain in effect even if the Assembly was dissolved and could not vote on the validity of the declaration of a
state of emergency. The maximum length of a state of emergency without requiring re-approval was also
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House of Representatives, and the state of emergency cannot exceed three months unless
it is further extended by a vote of two-thirds of the House of Representatives. 98 Despite
the more stringent requirement of the House of Representative's approval, a new state of
emergency can be continually extended as was possible for decades prior to May 31,
2012.99 As discussed infra, such a re-instatement would grant even greater flexibility to
abuse civilians' civil and political rights.
The declaration of a state of emergency would revive the Emergency Law, which
granted the president very broad powers. A state of emergency can be imposed "whenever
public security or order are threatened," whether due to war, a state threatening the erup-
tion of war, internal disturbances, natural disasters, or an epidemic. 0 0 Prior to the 2014
Constitution, the only procedural requirements were that the president declare a state of
emergency and specify its reason(s), the region(s) covered, the date of application, and
refer the declaration to the People's Assembly for ratification within fifteen days or at the
first meeting of the next Assembly if declared during the Assembly's recess.1 01
Under Article 3 of the Emergency Law, the state of emergency would grant the presi-
dent the power to:
(1) Restrict people's freedom of assembly, movement, residence, or passage in specific
times and places; arrest suspects or [persons who are] dangerous to public security
and order [and] detain them; allow searches of persons and places without being re-
stricted by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code; and assign anyone to
perform any of these tasks.1 02
This can be carried out by a simple oral or written order, among other expansive pow-
ers to abrogate civil and political rights.10 3 Articles 7 and 9 of the Emergency Law also
permit the creation of State Security Courts empowered to try violations of emergency
orders and criminal offenses referred by the president.1o 4 The president is also allowed to
order that military judges rather than ordinary judges preside in those courts.1 0 Addi-
tionally, the president can order that the State Security Courts follow different procedural
rules than the rules in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 0 6 Verdicts from state security
courts are not appealable.107
The continuation of the state of emergency was justified as necessary to combat terror-
ism threats. 0 8 In fact, in 2010, then-Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif rationalized that the
unspecified. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980,
May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007, art. 148.
98. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014 art. 154.
99. Id.
100. Law No. 162 of 1958, art. 1 (Law on State of Emergency), Al-]arida Al-Raiya, 27 Sept. 1958
(Egypt); Sadiq Reza, Endless Emergency, supra note 7, at 537-38.
101. Id. art. 2.
102. Reza, Endless Emergency, supra note 7, at 538.
103. Id.




108. Reza, Endless Emergency, supra note 7, at 544 (quoting Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of
Authoritarian Rule 56 (2004); Eldakak, supra note 11, at 287.
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extension of the state of emergency was consistent with national security measures taken
in the United States, such as the Patriot Act and the indefinite detention of suspects in
Guantanamo Bay.109 But following the expiration of the Emergency Law on May 31,
2012, terrorism prosecutions have moved to military courts.
III. Potential Limitations on Military Trials for Civilians
The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court has the competency to review military
courts' jurisdiction over civilians and the procedures they employ, by scrutinizing their
compatibility with the constitution. Jurisdiction may be limited by clearly defining the
terms and limits in Article 204 of the Constitution. Furthermore, practices that violate
individuals' due process rights-both in law and in practice-guaranteed under the consti-
tution, rights such as the Article 98 right to (an adequate) defense and the Article 96 right
to the presumption of innocence, may be prohibited.
A. COMPETENCY OF THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Article 192 of the 2014 Constitution states that "[t]he Supreme Constitutional Court
shall be solely competent to decide on the constitutionality of laws and regulations, to
interpret legislative provisions, and to adjudicate on disputes pertaining to the affairs of its
members, on jurisdictional disputes between judicial bodies and entities that have judicial
jurisdiction." 0 Previous constitutions granted the Supreme Constitutional Court the
same power of review."' Furthermore, Article 25 of the law on the Supreme Constitu-
tional Court, Law No. 48 of 1979, also grants the Supreme Constitutional Court the
jurisdiction to rule on conflicts of jurisdiction between judicial entities.11 2 Articles 48 and
49 of that law state that the Supreme Constitutional Court's judgments in constitutional
disputes are final, non-reviewable, and bind all persons and public bodies.113
The 2014 Constitution strengthened judicial independence of the Supreme Constitu-
tional Court. Article 191 specifies that the Court's budget is independent and must be
paid out in a single lump sum. 1 14 It also indicates that the Court's own General Assembly
is responsible for governing the Court's affairs, including appointing its own chief
justice.'' 5
109. Michael Slackman, Egyptian Emergency Law is Extended for 2 Years, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2010), at Al0,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/world/niddleeast/12egypt.html?_r=0.
110. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014, art. 192.
111. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art. 175; art. 175, 30 Nov. 2012.
112. El-Sawi, supra note 51, at 187; Reza, supra note 30, at 5-1.
113. Adel Omar Sherif, The Rule ofLaw in Egypt from a Judicial Perspective, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD 2 (Eugene Coran & Mai Yamani eds., 2000).
114. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014, art. 191.
115. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014 art. 193-94; Nathan Brown, Why do Egyptian Courts Say the Darndest
Things?, wASH. POST. (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/25/
why-do-egyptian-courts-say-the-darndest-things/ (The 2014 Constitution does not include a provision con-
VOL. 49, NO. 2
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
REVOLUTIONARY EGYPT 215
B. JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The Supreme Constitutional Court has exercised its competency to review military
tribunals' jurisdiction on various occasions in the past, overturning legislation and prac-
tices contrary to the constitution. These cases were decided under the 1971 constitutional
framework. Were the Supreme Constitutional Court to review legislation and practices
vis-i-vis military trials now, it would rely on a much more due process-robust constitu-
tion. Under the 1971 Constitution, the military courts' jurisdiction did not expressly pro-
vide for civilian trials, but left the regulation of military courts to the Code of Military
Justice and the Emergency Law." 6 This permitted civilians subject to military trials to
appeal their verdicts before the Supreme Constitutional Court." 7 Although the 2014
Constitution expressly provides for military trials of civilians in limited circumstances and
allows for further prescription by law, this is not a blank check to violate other constitu-
tional provisions-to allow it would infringe on the Court's constitutionally mandated
obligations in Article 192.
One case challenging military tribunals' jurisdiction over civilians reached the Supreme
Constitutional Court in 2011, before the enactment of the new post-Arab Spring Consti-
tutions. The appellant in that case sought to challenge the constitutionality of section 48
of the Code of Military Justice, which reads, "[t]he military judicial authorities alone de-
cide whether crimes fall under their jurisdiction."" 8 The case was not decided" 9 and has
now been foreclosed by Article 204 of the 2014 Constitution, which specifically defines
military courts' jurisdiction over civilians. But the Court's granting of certiorari confirms
its competency to review military courts' jurisdiction and operation.
In other cases, the Supreme Constitutional Court has carved out protections for impor-
tant individual rights in its case law. It has repeatedly asserted in its rulings that judicial
review is based on the provisions of the constitution in force, as it is the paramount law of
the land.120 In Case No. 47 of the 3rd Judicial Year'21 it stated that "[alll statutes which
are not constitutional provisions are subordinate to the Constitution, and are subject to
judicial review."1 22 In 1984, the Court ruled that the restrictions for appeal and other
procedures in the State Security Courts did not violate the constitution;12 3 however, that
tained in Article 176 of the 2012 Constitution, which stated that appointments to the Supreme Constitutional
Court "take place by a decree from the President of the Republic").
116. Rana Muhammad Taha, Constitutional Articles on Armed Forces Stir Controversy, DAILY NEws EGYPT
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/11/21/constitutional-articles-on-armed-forces-stir-
controversy/.
117. Id.
118. Law No. 25 of 1966 (Code of Military Justice, as amended in 2012),Al-aridaAl-Rasmyya § 48 (Egypt)
(unofficial English translation on file with author, courtesy of Farah Al Haddad).
119. Hatem Elliesie, Rule of Law in Egypt, in UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN VARious LEGAL
ORDERS OF THE WORLD 1, 11 (Matthias Koetter & Gunnar Folke Schuppert eds., 2010) ("At odds with its
strong record of rights activism, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled Egypt's emergency courts constitu-
tional, and it has conspicuously delayed issuing a ruling on the constitutionality of civilian transfers to military
courts").
120. Awad Mohammed El-Morr, Recent Landmark Deciions of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, in
Democracy, in THE RULE OF LAW AND ISLAM 239, 242-43 (Eugene Coran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1999);
Sherif, supra note 51, at 327.
121. Case No. 47 / 1983 / Supreme Constitutional Court, (Eg).
122. Sherif, supra note 113, at 6.
123. Reza, Endless Emergency, supra note 7, at 548.
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case was decided under a much weaker constitutional framework. Moreover, as detailed
infra, the 1971 Constitution did not have an explicit provision recognizing the right to
criminal appeals, which the 2014 Constitution does contain. Cases upholding the right to
defense, to a fair trial and to the presumption of innocence all arose when the 1971 Con-
stitution, with less defined and protective due process rights, was in place.
In Case No. 13 of the 12th Judicial Year,1 24 the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled
that an anti-smuggling statute that established a presumption of guilt if someone was
found in possession of a stolen artifact was unconstitutional.125 The Court stated that
such a law violated the constitutional guarantees of the presumption of innocence and
right to a fair trial. In addition to reiterating the Constitution's status as the supreme law
of Egypt, it said that given the seriousness of the penalties attached to a criminal convic-
tion and the potential threat to the defendant's right to life, everything must be clearly
defined in a criminal case from the charges to meeting each of the required elements with
concrete evidence.1 26 The Court also recognized a minimum standard of due process
rights owed to the accused in order to protect persons' inalienable values that cannot be
dispensed with.1 27 Case No. 3 of the 10th Judicial Year 28 established that a law allowing a
person's criminal record to be introduced against them in proceedings involving current
crimes was unconstitutional. Such use of character evidence violated numerous articles of
the 1971 Constitution.1 29 Finally, the Supreme Constitutional Court also upheld the con-
stitutional right to freedom of speech when it ruled in Case No. 44 of the 7th Judicial
Year.1 30 In that case, the Court found that a statute prohibiting political parties from
being created if their founders or leaders advocated or encouraged principles inconsistent
with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty violated the petitioners' right to freedom of speech.131
The Supreme Constitutional Court has ruled against statutes that blatantly violated
constitutional rights even when the standing Constitution provided for much more lim-
ited civil and political rights. Thus, under the 2014 Constitution's broader and more
detailed protections, the Court should be able to find that the military judiciary's proce-
dures in trying civilians are inconsistent with those civilians' constitutional rights. Since
the 1990s, the Court has also adopted the practice of referring to international human
rights and foreign national legal materials as a source in its rulings; therefore, an examina-
tion into other military justice systems, infra, may prove valuable.132
C. JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
The Supreme Constitutional Court has not been the only Egyptian court to overturn
legislation contrary to superior laws. The Minister of Justice issued Decree No. 4991/
124. Case No. 13 / 1992 / Supreme Constitutional Court, (Eg).
125. El-Morr, spra note 120, at 242-43.
126. Id. at 243-44.
127. Id. at 244.
128. Sherif, supra note 113, at 18-19.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 4.
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2012, which was published in the Official Gazette on June 13, 2012.133 The decree stated
that, without prejudice to the Code of Military Justice, military prosecutors had arresting
authority over non-military personnel for crimes in chapters 1, 2, 2(bis), 7, 12 and 13 of
the Penal Code.1 34 This expanded jurisdiction included competence over persons who
committed the crime of offending an official.1 35 Under Article 133, a person may be
detained for up to six months for "affront[ing] by signal, talk, or threat, a public official!
civil servant, a law officer, or any person charged with a public service, while performing
his duty, or due to its performance." But if the affront is directed against a judicial or
administrative court, a council or one of its members, the person may be punished for up
to a year in prison. Likewise, Article 184 punishes "[w]hoever affronts or insults in any of
the foregoing methods, the People's Assembly, the Shura Council, or other regular orga-
nizations, the Army, the tribunals, the Authorities, or Public Departments" with an unde-
fined period of detention and a fine.
This law could have enabled acts of dissent to be construed as crimes under the Penal
Code. And military prosecutions, because of their greater expediency and harsher
sentences, could have been employed to effectively chill opposition.1 36 Less than a month
later, on June 26, 2012, the Egyptian First Circuit Administrative Court-Individual Dis-
putes revoked the Minister of Justice's decree.1 37 The Court reasoned that Article 23 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure grants the Minister of Justice the right to confer judicial
capacity. However, because the powers of arrest are defined by law, the minister cannot
expand these powers by administrative decree.1 38
D. VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS UNDER THE 2014 CONsTITUTION
The 2014 Constitution has introduced numerous detailed provisions guaranteeing due
process rights that did not exist under the 1971 Constitution.1 39 Military trials for civil-
ians, though provided for in the new constitution, violate several of these constitutional
due process rights. Barring yet another Constitutional reform, the Supreme Constitu-
tional Court can best narrow the military courts' jurisdiction over civilians by narrowing
the scope of ambiguous terms in Article 204, and by declaring certain provisions in the
Code of Military Justice and the procedures in military trials unconstitutional.140
133. Welcome to the Military State of Egypt: Minister offustice Decree more Repressive than State of Emergency,
Grants Militay Police and Militaiy Intelligence Judicial Authority to Arrest Civilians, CAIRO INST. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS STUDIES, Jun. 13, 2012, http://www.cihrs.org/?p=2846&lang=en.
134. Id.
135. Egypt: Military Power grab Creates Conditions for Abuse, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Jun. 21, 2012, http://
www.hrw.org/print/news/2012/06/21/egypt-military-power-grab-creates-conditions-abuse.
136. Trager,supra note 26.
137. Administrative Court Rules in Favor of Appeal Presented by Human Rights NGOs, Revokes Decree Enabling
Militay Intelligence and Militay Police to Arrest Civilians, CAIRO INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES (Jun. 26,
2012) http://www.cihrs.org/?p=3073&lang=en.
138. Id.
139. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, Part III, art. 54.
140. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014, art. 204.
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As they stand, military trials violate several of civilians' constitutional rights. Article 54
sets out basic procedural due process guarantees.141 According to this provision, the pro-
cedure authorities must take to ensure due process and personal freedom is as follows:
Every person whose freedom is restricted shall be immediately notified of the reasons
therefore; shall be informed of his/her rights in writing; shall be immediately enabled
to contact his/her relatives and lawyer; and shall be brought before the investigation
authority within twenty-four (24) hours as of the time of restricting his/her freedom.
Investigation may not start with the person unless his/her lawyer is present. A lawyer
shall be seconded for persons who do not have one.
In all events, it is not permissible to present for trial in crimes that may be punishable
by imprisonment unless a lawyer is present.142
This Article specifically lays out a person's rights when in custody. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, it recognizes the detainee's right to contact their attorney, their right not to be
questioned until the attorney is present, and the right to be represented by their attorney
at trial.1 43 It stands in direct opposition to military tribunals' practice of restricting de-
fendants' access to their lawyers or to lawyers of their choosing.
Article 54 is also starkly different from Article 71 of the 1971 Constitution. Although
Article 71 recognizes the detainee's right to be informed of the reasons for detention, it
states the detainee "shall have the right to communicate with whoever he sees fit and
inform them of what has taken place and to ask for help in way organized by law." 44 The
older provision does not recognize the detainee's right to contact their own attorney, nor
their right to be represented by her attorney of choice.14 The 1971 Constitution only
stated in Article 67 "[e]very person accused of a crime must be provided with counsel for
his defense."146 There is no guarantee not to be questioned outside the presence of an
attorney. Tellingly, the 1971 Constitution had no provision equivalent to Article 55 in the
new constitution. 4 7 This new article establishes the accused's right to remain silent and
outlaws the use of torture or other degrading or inhuman treatment against detainees; it
also declares information obtained through torture, terror or coercion inadmissible.
Article 98 of the 2014 Constitution also defines the right of defense as not only defend-
ing oneself in person or by proxy, and the right to a court-appointed attorney for the
indigent, but also "[t]he independence of the legal profession and the protection of its
rights is a guarantee for the right of defense."1 48 The 1971 Constitution's equivalent,
Article 69, did not define the right of defense and merely reiterated the right to defend
141. Id., pt. III, art. 54.
142. Id. pt. III, art. 54.
143. Id.
144. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art.71.
145. See id.
146. Id. ch. 4, art. 67.
147. See generally id.; CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May
22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014, art. 55.
148. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014, art. 98.
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oneself in person or by proxy and the right to a court-appointed attorney.1 49 Article 96 of
the 2014 Constitution further stipulates the right to the presumption of innocence 50 "un-
til proven guilty in a fair legal trial in which the right to defend himself is guaranteed."
Although the 1971 Constitution mentions the right to the presumption of innocence in
Article 67, it makes no reference to a fair trial.151 A fair trial necessarily implies the need
to contact one's attorney, so as to give that attorney enough time to familiarize him or
herself with the record and build a proper defense. A fair trial also necessarily excludes
thirty minute long mass trials, often in the absence of adequate legal counsel, which are
reported to have occurred repeatedly before military tribunals following Mubarak's
ouster. 152
Military courts' implementation of the appeals procedure detailed in section 99 of the
Code of Military Justice renders Article 240 of the 2014 Constitution - which formally
grants the right to criminal appeals and states that a criminal appeals system must be
established by 2024 - essentially meaningless.13 Additionally, section 8(bis) of the Code
also stands in contravention to Article 80 of the Constitution, which establishes special
protections for juveniles facing trial.
With respect to military courts' jurisdiction, section 7 of the Code of Military Justice
could be said to expand the scope of military courts' power beyond what Article 204 of the
Constitution prescribes. 54 Law 136 of 2014 also contradicts Article 204.'ss Although it
allows for the competencies and crimes within military court jurisdiction to be defined by
law, the Supreme Constitutional Court could rule that the article clearly intended to allow
a very narrow exception to the prohibition on military trials for civilians. Such a massive
expansion of military court jurisdiction would be incompatible and thus unconstitutional.
The law also runs afoul of the prohibition on the retroactive application of laws contained
in Article 95 of the Constitution. 5 6 This is because crimes that were committed prior to
its promulgation in October 2014 are being transferred and tried before military courts
even though they were not crimes within those courts' jurisdiction at the time they were
committed.
In sum, the 2014 Egyptian Constitution, although formally authorizing military trials
for civilians, also grants all citizens much more robust constitutional rights. These consti-
tutionally protected rights to due process can be employed to limit the secretive and loose
procedures the military operates under. Bringing military trials to procedural standard
with those carried out in civilian tribunals alone would sharply decrease the attractiveness
149. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art. 69.
150. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014, art. 96; see also Reza, supra note 30, at 5-8.
151. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art.67.
152. Trager, supra note 26; see also Chick, supra note 34 (detailing an actual incident of such a military
tribunal lasting five minutes).
153. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014, art. 240.
154. See id. ch. 3, art. 204.
155. See id.
156. See id. pt. IV, art. 94.
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in employing military courts to try civilians.15 7 Should cases challenging the violations of
these constitutional rights be brought before the Supreme Constitutional Court, it would
be acting under its clear mandate if it limits the military judiciary's jurisdiction and prac-
tices vis-a-vis civilians.
IV. Comparative Models: The United States Military Justice System
Military justice systems serve a crucial role in their respective nations' legal systems. As
a parallel system of courts, they allow a country's military to swiftly deal with offences that
may be considered minor in civilian life, but that are crucial to the functioning of the
armed forces.158 Specifically, it ensures good order and discipline, so that the military may
function properly.159 As a result, trials before military courts are often stricter and quicker
than that provided in civilian courts. 160 Several different military justice models have
evolved around the world; these can be divided into the purely civilian model, the struc-
turally hybrid model, the jurisdictionally hybrid model, and the purely military model.
According to the purely civilian model, civilian courts have jurisdiction over military
judicial matters.161 In the structurally hybrid model, there are specialized chambers
within civilian courts that deal specifically with military judicial matters.1 62 The jurisdic-
tionally hybrid model is the most complex. Military and civilian courts have overlapping
jurisdiction, and the referral of cases may depend on various factors including the serious-
ness of the offence, the identity of the victim, where the offence was committed, and
whether the offence was committed in wartime or peacetime.163 In France, for example,
civilian courts try offences committed in France, while military courts try offences com-
mitted abroad.1 64 In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, military courts deal with
criminal offences that occur between members of the armed forces, while civilian courts
deal with offences that occur between members of the armed forces and civilians.165 In
the purely military model, military courts have exclusive jurisdiction over military offences
committed by military personnel.1 66
157. Trager,supra note 26.
158. Mindia Vashakmadze, GUIDEBOOK: UNDERSTANDING MILITARY JUSTICE 10 (Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010), http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Guidebook-Understanding-
Military-Justice; Joseph W. Bishop Jr., The Case for Military Justice, 62 MIL. L. REv. 215, 216 - 19 (1973);
Kenneth J. Hodson, Military Justice: Abolish or Change?, 1975 MIL. L. REv. 579, 584 (1975); Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974), see also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953); James B. Roan & Cynthia
Buxton, The American Military Justice System in the New Millennium, 52 A.F. L. REv. 185, 186 (2002) ("The
maintenance of good order and discipline is an absolutely essential function of command.").
159. See Hodson, supra note 158, at 584; see also O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1957); see also In re
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890) ("An armyis not a deliberative body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that
of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of obedience
in the soldier.").
160. See Vashakmadze, supra note 158, at 10; see also Bishop, spra note 158, at 216-17.
161. Vashakmadze, supra note 158, at 10.
162. Id.
163. Vashakmadze, supra note 158, at 12.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 22.
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Most military justice systems' jurisdictions are defined by a combination of different
factors.167 With status-based jurisdiction, only members of the armed forced may be tried
in military courts. 168 Status-connected jurisdiction only covers crimes related to military
service, and jurisdiction based on purely military crimes only extends jurisdiction over
crimes of military character.1 69 All of these factors have vague or malleable definitions.
For example, status-based jurisdiction is ambiguous concerning reservists or civilians ac-
companying the armed forces abroad. Constitutional courts have played crucial roles in
shaping and limiting their respective military courts' jurisdiction, while preserving the
integrity of the military justice model they operate in.170
It is therefore instructive to examine the United States' military justice system, which
has a jurisdictionally-hybrid model with status-based jurisdiction.171 Although other sys-
tems, such as the German model, which follows the purely civilian model during peace-
time, reflect a global trend toward the civilianization of military justice, it is of limited use
for the Egyptian legal system as the Egyptian Constitution expressly provides for military
trials for civilians.172
A. THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
The United States' military justice system is best separated into three broad categories:
military justice, the law of war and martial law. Military justice may be described as the
judicial system that governs members of the armed forces and others closely associated
with them.17 3 The law of war concerns matters related to armed conflict, such as the
detention of enemy combatants and the prosecution of war crimes. 174 Finally, martial law
refers to a state of emergency when civilian laws and courts have been up-ended and
criminal law for both service members and civilians must be administered by the military
judicial system.17 The U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed these broad divisions in past
case law.176 All three are governed by the United States Constitution and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.
Article I § 8 of the United States Constitution expressly provides for the establishment
of military courts: "[tlhe Congress shall have power . . . [t]o make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces . . . [t]o provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in
the service of the United States."1 77 Furthermore, the Necessary and Proper clause, con-
tained within that same section of the Constitution, also implicitly authorizes the existence
of military courts, by granting Congress the power "[to make all laws which shall be
167. Id.
168. Vashakmadze, supra note 158, at 22.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 18.
171. Id. at 12.
172. Id. at 11.
173. Robinson 0. Everett, Persons Who Can Be Tried By Court-Martial, 5 J. OF PUB. L. 148, 150 (1956).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 141-42 (1866) (distinguishing between "military law", "military govern-
ment", and "martial law proper").
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other pow-
ers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any depart-
ment thereof."178 Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in
1950, which is the basis of modern U.S. military justice.1 79 It details the composition and
procedure of military courts, punishable offences before those courts, and the procedural
rights granted to all accused before those courts.1 80 Although the rules and offences pre-
scribed in the UCMJ differ from their civilian counterparts, the Code adheres to civilian
standards as much as possible and ensures that defendants in military trials enjoy the same
constitutional protections as defendants in civilian trials.181
1. Military Justice: Military Trials of Service Members and Certain Civilians
There are different levels of trial in military court, all called court-martial.182 The
Manual for Courts-Martial elaborates the procedures in the UCMJ for conducting these
trials.183 All courts-martial must comply with the following due process guarantees: The
government must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused has the right to pre-
sent evidence and cross-examine witnesses, the accused is protected from being compelled
to incriminate themselves, and the accused is provided with defense counsel. 8 4 Further-
more, the military rules of evidence closely resemble the civilian Federal Rules of
Evidence.1 85
The right to appeal is also enshrined in Article 66 of the UCMJ, which states that all
trials resulting in a sentence that includes punitive discharge or confinement of a year or
longer may be appealed to the Service Courts of Criminal Appeals, the first level of mili-
tary appellate courts.18 6 These courts have the authority to conduct de novo review 87 and
are further empowered to overturn a court-martial verdict of their own volition.' 88 The
case may be further appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF),
which is composed of five civilian judges appointed by the President with advice and con-
sent of the Congress and provides civilian oversight to the military justice system.1 89
Under Article 67 of the UCMJ, defendants may further appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court. However, if the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces declines to review,
the defendant is unable to request a writ of certiorari. In such a case, the defendant may
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
179. James B. Roan & Cynthia Buxton, The American MilitaryJustice System in the New Millennium, 52 A.F.
L. REv. 185, 186-87 (2002).
180. Dan E. Stigall, An Unnecessary Convenience: The Assertion of the Uniform Code of Militaryyustice (UCMJ)
Over Civilians and the Implications ofInternational Human Rights Law, 17 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 59,63
(Winter 2009).
181. Id.
182. Roan & Buxton, supra note 179, at 199.
183. Stigall, supra note 180, at 62-65; Roan & Buxton, supra note 179, at 196.
184. Roan & Buxton, supra note 179, at 199-200, 204-05.
185. Fredric I. Lederer, The Military Rules of Evidence: Origins and Judicial Implementation, 6 (1990).
Faculty Publications. Paper 638. http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/638.
186. Roan & Buxton, supra note 179, at 210; 10 U.S.C. § 866, art. 66 (1996).
187. BLACK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 117 (10th ed. 2014) (Appeal de novo: An appeal in which the appellate
court uses the trial court's record but reviews the evidence and law without deference to the trial court's
rulings.)
188. Roan & Buxton, supra note 179, at 210.
189. Id.; 10 U.S.C.A. § 942 (West 2015).
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still obtain collateral civilian review-a non-appeal proceeding whereby a defendant can
challenge their conviction on procedural grounds, such as violations of their due process
guarantees during trial-which may result in the order for a new trial, new sentencing or
new appeal procedure.
In Burns v. Wilson, the Supreme Court permitted collateral review of military verdicts
on constitutional grounds, in other words, through the writ of habeas corpus, which exam-
ines violations of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States.1 90
The U.S. Supreme Court has reviewed a number of courts-martial verdicts, some chal-
lenging jurisdiction over civilians in the UCMJ. Article 2 of the UCMJ defines which
persons fall under military courts' jurisdiction.191 These include regular service members,
certain retirees, persons serving court-martial imposed sentences, prisoners of war, certain
reservists, as well as persons accompanying the armed forces.192 The categories of persons
listed in this article are extremely detailed. The last category mentioned, however, in-
cludes civilians and has been the subject of constitutional review before the Supreme
Court. Article 2 states:
(a) [t]he following persons are subject to this chapter [UCMJ]:
(10) In a time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or
accompanying an armed force in the field.
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a
party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by,
or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.193
Article 2 is intended to cover a jurisdictional gap. In United States v. Burney, the Court
of Military Affairs-the precursor to CAAF-defined these civilians as persons who
"ha[ve] moved with a military operation and . . . [whose] presence with the armed force
was not merely incidental, but directly connected with, or dependent upon, the activities
of the armed force or its personnel ... [including one who] instead, works for a contractor
engaged on a military project."1 94 Further, in United States v. Ali, the CAAF explained
that article 2(a)(10) further requires either declared war or being "in an area of actual
fighting."195 Congress amended the UCMJ with the purpose of having persons "em-
ployed by" the armed forces outside of the United States-specifically civilian employees
of the Department of Defense and military contractors-as well as persons "accompany-
190. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953) ("In this case, we are dealing with habeas corpus applicants
who assert - rightly or wrongly - that they have been imprisoned and sentenced to death as a result of
proceedings which denied them basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution."); Brian C. Baldrate, The Su-
preme Court's Role in Defining the jurisdiction ofMilitay Trihunals: A Study, Critique & Proposal for Hamudan v.
Rumsfeld, 186 MIL. L. REv. 1, 16-20 (Winter 2005).
191. 10 U.S.C. § 802, art. 2 (2014).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. United States v. Burney, 6 C.M.A. 776, 788 (1956).
195. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 264 (C.A.A.F. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2338 (2013).
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ing" the armed forces-specifically dependents of service members and other employ-
ees-fall under the jurisdiction granted by the UCMJ outside of times of declared war. 196
There were several cases brought before the Supreme Court prior to the amendment of
Article 2. In Reid v. Covert, the Court held that permitting the application of the UCMJ to
civilian dependents would run afoul of the Constitution.1 97 Specifically, it stated that
"[e]very extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the
civil courts, and, more important, acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial and of
other treasured constitutional protections."1 98 In United States ex. rel. Toth v. Quarles, an
ex-service member was charged with a murder he allegedly committed while serving as an
airman in Korea.1 99 The Supreme Court invalidated the conviction as unconstitutional.200
It stated that the justification for abrogating a persons' rights by submitting them to court-
martial was to maintain the discipline, morale and order of the armed forces, but that
giving an ex-serviceman the benefit of a civilian trial would not disrupt any of these pur-
poses. 20 1 Furthermore, it stated that the power to court-martial should be limited to "the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed." 202 But these cases left a jurisdictional
gap whereby military courts could not try civilian employees or dependents of employees,
but the local judicial system where the armed forces were deployed also could not try
these persons as a result of Status of Force Agreements signed between the United States
and those countries. 203 Congress amended Article 2 of the UCMJ, to require civilians to
not only be employed by or accompany the armed forces abroad, but also do so at a time
of declared war or during a contingency operation in order to be court-martialed.204
Additionally, Congress enacted the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000,
which granted civilian federal courts jurisdiction over civilians "employed by" or "accom-
panying" the armed forces outside the United States.205 In a memorandum issued on
March 10, 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates specified that if an offence is commit-
ted by a civilian, the Department of Justice will be notified and given priority to prosecute
the case instead of the military justice system. If the Department of Justice were to de-
cline prosecution, the military courts would exercise jurisdiction under amended Article 2
of the UCMJ.206
2. Armed Conflict: The Military Justice System and the Laws of War
If Egypt attempts to deal with an issue relating to terrorism that required resorting to
extraordinary measures, the U.S. system offers an instructive model. A person who falls
196. Stigall, supra note 180, at 70.
197. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
198. Id. at 2 1.
199. United States ex. rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13 (1955).
200. Id. at 23.
201. United States ex. rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955).
202. Id. at 23.
203. Stigall, supra note 180, at 69-70.
204. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. 109-364, § 552, 120
Stat. 2217; Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Memorandum of March 10, 2008, available at http://fas.org/
sgp/othergov/dod/gates-ucmj.prf); Stigall, supra note 180, at 71-73.
205. Stigall, supra note 180, at 70; Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523,
114 Stat. 2488.
206. Gates Memorandum, supra note 204; Stigall, spra note 180, at 72-73.
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outside the categories described in the section supra, can only be subject to military justice
if their combatant status is first established. Once combatant status is established, the
person may be subject to military trial to punish violations of the laws of war. 207 Article
18 of the UCMJ grants general courts-martial the jurisdiction "to try any person who by
the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment
permitted by the law of war." 208
Status determination hearings must comply with due process guarantees, and the Su-
preme Court has stepped in to ensure it does. 209 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of the defendant's enemy combatant status hearing. 210 It
stressed the importance of due process guarantees in these proceedings, although it al-
lowed certain evidentiary practices that would otherwise be impermissible.211 As the de-
fendant was captured in Afghanistan, the Court recognized the difficulty in complying
with normal evidentiary rules in an active theatre of war. 212 For example, it stated hearsay
evidence may need to be accepted and that the burden of proof might presume the gov-
ernment's evidence is credible, so long as that presumption is rebuttable. The Court
stressed Hamdi's right to challenge his enemy combatant status before a neutral tribunal,
and reaffirmed the Supreme Court's role in reviewing the constitutionality of military
actions. 213
In a later case, Hamdan v. Runmfeld, the Court declared that military commissions
formed under Executive Order in 2001 were unconstitutional.214 These commissions
were established to try persons suspected of terrorist activity, had weakened procedural
and evidentiary rules, and did not have a Grand Jury or equivalent investigation require-
ment.2 15 The defendant and defense counsel were excluded from parts of the proceedings,
coerced statements were admissible as evidence, and defendants were prohibited from ap-
pealing to any court.2 16 The Court ruled that these military commissions violated both
the Geneva Conventions and the UCMJ. 2 17 Article 21 of the UCMJ prescribes military
commissions, while Article 36 restricts "the President's power to promulgate rules of pro-
cedure for courts-martial and military commissions." 2 18 Specifically, the rules cannot be
contrary to or inconsistent with the UCMJ and must conform to courts-martial standards
as far as possible.219 The Supreme Court conclusively held that any military adjudication,
even if conducted against a foreign citizen who is suspected of terrorism, cannot run afoul
of the due process guarantees enshrined in law.220
207. See Jurisdiction of General Courts-Marital, 10 U.S.C. § 818(a).
208. 10 U.S.C.A. § 818 (article 18(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
209. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 511 (2004).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 533-34.
213. Id. at 537-38.
214. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 588, 609, 647 (2006).
215. Id.
216. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 614-15 (2006).
217. Id. at 625.
218. Id. at 612-13, 620.
219. Id. at 615-16.
220. Id. at 620-21, 625.
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In Ex parte Quinn, the Supreme Court stated that citizenship is not dispositive of enemy
combatant status.22 1 It upheld the military convictions and death sentences of eight Ger-
man spies even though one of the defendants was an American citizen.2 22 It further stated
that, although both lawful and unlawful combatants are subject to detention (the former as
prisoners of war), only the latter are subject to military trial because unlawful combatants
are belligerents in violation of the laws of war who lose the privileges of the prisoner of
war status. 223
Detainees are also entitled to petition for collateral constitutional review to challenge
the constitutionality of their status determination proceedings by filing a habeas corpus
petition. 224 In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court set out a three-part balancing test to deter-
mine whether the detainee may petition for constitutional review. 225 First, the relevant
court must consider the detainee's citizenship, status, and the adequacy of process he re-
ceived in his status determination proceeding. Second, it must consider the nature of the
sites where capture and detention took place, whether he was captured on the battlefield,
and whether he is held somewhere under dejure or defacto American sovereignty.226 Fi-
nally, it must consider the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's habeas
corpus entitlement.227 So even in cases dealing with exceptionally delicate national security
matters, the Supreme Court retains competence to review and restrict proceedings that do
not comply with the U.S. Constitution.
3. Martial Law in the United States
Finally, the U.S. system does not impose martial law unless it is dealing with the most
extreme of circumstances: invasion or insurrection. Martial law describes a state where
military courts exercise jurisdiction over both civilians and non-civilians in order to main-
tain law and order in the country during a time of emergency. 228 Although there is no
mention of martial law in the UCMJ, there is illustrative case law from the American Civil
War period that sheds light on its operation. In Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243
(1863), a defendant was tried and convicted before a military tribunal under the charge of
being a Confederate sympathizer. He attempted to appeal to the Supreme Court, but it
determined that his case was not reviewable in civilian courts.229 In Ex parte Milligan, a
resident of Indiana-a State that was not engaged in rebellion during the Civil War-was
convicted and sentenced to death before a military tribunal on the same charges as Val-
landigham.230 But the Supreme Court held his sentence invalid.231 The Court explained
221. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942).
222. Id. at 44-45.
223. Id. at 30-31.
224. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 427-28 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004).
225. Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008).
226. Id. at 768; Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
227. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769.
228. Everett, supra note 173, at 151; Brian C. Baldrate, The Supreme Court's Role in Defining the ]urisdiction of
Militay Trihunals: A Study, Critique & Proposal for Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 186 MIL. L. Rv. 1, 8-9 (Winter
2005).
229. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 248 (1863).
230. Compare Vallandigham, 68 U.S. at 248, with Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866).
231. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 4.
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that martial law does not apply to areas outside of military operations. 2 32 Declaration of
martial law is considered such an extreme measure that the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in very stark terms. 233
B. SUMNMARY
The U.S. example is instructive not only in the manner that justice dispensed through
military courts is categorized, but also in the limits it draws when civilians are court-
martialed under Article 2 of the UCMJ. In order for military justice to serve its purpose
of maintaining order and discipline so that the armed forces may accomplish their mis-
sion, military courts only need jurisdiction over civilians employed by the military or ac-
companying the military in a time of declared war or in an area of actual fighting. Beyond
this, the military only needs to prosecute civilians when they fall outside civilian courts'
jurisdiction, as they cannot let crimes go unpunished for that reason alone-a rationale
similar to that articulated in Milligan.
V. Conclusion
Egyptian civilians facing trial before military courts in Egypt are in a precarious situa-
tion. The procedural practices in those courts are extreme and becoming even more so.
They do not conform to basic standards for fair trial. The Supreme Constitutional Court
is in a unique position to exercise its constitutional powers of review and mandate that
military courts' practices fall in line with the due process rights guaranteed to all persons
who stand trial in Egyptian courts-be they civilian or military. In its case law, the United
States Supreme Court has restricted military court's jurisdiction over civilians and ensure
military justice does not violate defendants' procedural rights. Like peer courts, the Egyp-
tian Supreme Constitutional Court has the competency to review the military justice sys-
tem, and may limit military courts' practices to conform to the Constitution without
gutting the purpose of military trials: ensuring discipline and order within the armed
forces.
232. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127 ("there are occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If, in foreign
invasions or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice accord-
ing to law, then, on the theater of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to
furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and
as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free
course.").
233. Everett, supra note 173, at 151.
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